I could not disagree more strongly with the basic thesis and the assumptions behind it. It is a highly flawed approach driven by the flawed basic assumptions of an ill conceived academic discipline. Personally I am all for doing away with the academic discipline of International Relations entirely. As it is currently conceived it is based on a body of work--international relations theory--that is about as valuable to solving global political problems as a warm bucket of piss. As much as I ordinarily despise most people who make such arguments, it is basically a collection of ideas that only those under the shelter of the ivory tower have the luxury of holding.
Basic conflict resolution theory, based on extensive psychological, sociological, and historical data on the micro and macro scale, dictates that the simplest and surest methods of conflict resolution work when the system only consists of the two parties involved in a bilateral conflict. At the end of the day bilateral conflict resolution boils down to a simple cost/benefit analysis. Each side has a set of needs and wants, as well as a finite set of options available to each party in the conflict to adjust the other side's perceived cost/benefit ratio (as well as their own) in their favor. Generally speaking the last option used is diplomatic negotiations, because those occur when both sides of the conflict feel their tolerance for conflict is exhausted and that compromise is now the option that will bring them the greatest benefit for the cost.
The international involvement, the so-called "Quartet", and everyone else who has their dirty little fingers in the pie of this conflict, complicate the dynamics so heavily that normal conflict resolution dynamics do not apply and the state of conflict becomes essentially interminable. It alters both the set of options and the cost-benefit ratio and creates a very volatile atmosphere that basically dooms peace efforts to fail before they ever start.
Aside from forcing premature negotiations when large numbers of people and leaders on both sides still felt they had other options, they also themselves provided a whole array of external forces to be manipulated and hence a whole new set of options. For example, in late 2000 when Barak offered a revolutionary set of concessions, arafat perceived that a new intifadeh combined with strong public relations could bring severe international pressure to bear on Israel and extract further concessions. In bilateral negotiations as simple force assessment would dictate that with the palestinian people perceiving no outside help on the way political tolerance for the cost in Palestinian lives would wane quickly and cost Arafat politically. However ill conceived his decision in september of 2000 may have been, Arafat was not a stupid man. an asshole perhaps, but not stupid. He lost the political chessgame eventually, but he put up a pretty good fight.
So at the end of the day a resolution to that conflict has to come from those two sides and those two sides ALONE. For a settlement to be reached, both sides must simultaneously realize that they are out of viable options whose cost they can afford to bear, and that the time has come to sit down with the other, compromise, and hammer out a deal.
perhaps you should post this to israelipolitics. I can copy and paste my response. perhaps we can wake the community up from its long hibernation. that subject ought to get a few people on there good and riled up.
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Date: 2009-05-27 08:23 pm (UTC)Basic conflict resolution theory, based on extensive psychological, sociological, and historical data on the micro and macro scale, dictates that the simplest and surest methods of conflict resolution work when the system only consists of the two parties involved in a bilateral conflict. At the end of the day bilateral conflict resolution boils down to a simple cost/benefit analysis. Each side has a set of needs and wants, as well as a finite set of options available to each party in the conflict to adjust the other side's perceived cost/benefit ratio (as well as their own) in their favor. Generally speaking the last option used is diplomatic negotiations, because those occur when both sides of the conflict feel their tolerance for conflict is exhausted and that compromise is now the option that will bring them the greatest benefit for the cost.
The international involvement, the so-called "Quartet", and everyone else who has their dirty little fingers in the pie of this conflict, complicate the dynamics so heavily that normal conflict resolution dynamics do not apply and the state of conflict becomes essentially interminable. It alters both the set of options and the cost-benefit ratio and creates a very volatile atmosphere that basically dooms peace efforts to fail before they ever start.
Aside from forcing premature negotiations when large numbers of people and leaders on both sides still felt they had other options, they also themselves provided a whole array of external forces to be manipulated and hence a whole new set of options. For example, in late 2000 when Barak offered a revolutionary set of concessions, arafat perceived that a new intifadeh combined with strong public relations could bring severe international pressure to bear on Israel and extract further concessions. In bilateral negotiations as simple force assessment would dictate that with the palestinian people perceiving no outside help on the way political tolerance for the cost in Palestinian lives would wane quickly and cost Arafat politically. However ill conceived his decision in september of 2000 may have been, Arafat was not a stupid man. an asshole perhaps, but not stupid. He lost the political chessgame eventually, but he put up a pretty good fight.
So at the end of the day a resolution to that conflict has to come from those two sides and those two sides ALONE. For a settlement to be reached, both sides must simultaneously realize that they are out of viable options whose cost they can afford to bear, and that the time has come to sit down with the other, compromise, and hammer out a deal.
perhaps you should post this to
no subject
Date: 2009-05-28 12:54 am (UTC)no subject
Date: 2009-05-28 01:13 am (UTC)